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Abstract
Today, the global public health community places an emphasis on creating “sustainable” intervention
mechanisms that integrate with local governments and existing infrastructure for long term success. Through
an in-depth evaluation of Botswana’s public-private healthcare intervention to combat HIV/AIDS, with
supporting on-the-ground interviews and extensive evaluation of published data, I argue that key factors
deemed essential for long-term sustainable healthcare programs have the potential to isolate and additionally
harm certain segments of a population. Given the distinct marginalization of key populations, the concept of
sustainability needs to be recast in a manner that achieves health for all segments of a population.
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ABSTRACT 
 
Today, the global public health community places an emphasis on creating “sustainable” 
intervention mechanisms that integrate with local governments and existing infrastructure for 
long term success. Through an in-depth evaluation of Botswana’s public-private healthcare 
intervention to combat HIV/AIDS, with supporting on-the-ground interviews and extensive 
evaluation of published data, I argue that key factors deemed essential for long-term 
sustainable healthcare programs have the potential to isolate and additionally harm certain 
segments of a population. Given the distinct marginalization of key populations, the concept of 
sustainability needs to be recast in a manner that achieves health for all segments of a 
population.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the contemporary world, the global south has faced the highest burden of 
deadly disease than any other region. As the international community has worked to 
understand and interpret the far-reaching effects of the many global epidemics, global 
public healthcare ventures have adapted and changed to incorporate the factors necessary 
for success in addressing the public health concerns stemming from these 
diseases. Global public health has faced many trials and tribulations in creating and 
implementing a program that is truly effective or sustainable for the long term. 
Sustainability, the buzzword of the healthcare intervention world, is considered by many 
to be the future of all global health programs. Fundamentally, a program that is 
sustainable increases access to quality care by engaging in strong partnerships that 
generate fiduciary or personnel contributions, utilize innovative delivery models, and 
adapt to local situational circumstances. (Novartis 2015) “Sustainability” is a concept 
frequently referred to in global health as a marker of success of global health initiatives; 
it is often applied in the evaluation of the impact of such initiatives. It was also born out 
of frustration of those providing the funding with the lack of continuity of public health 
programs that were often felt to reflect poor infrastructure, inadequate training of 
personnel, and public health objectives that are too broad.  
The potential for sustainability became, and remains today, a key criterion in the 
ability to attract funding for global health given the belief that it enables continuous 
public health programs. Initial programs that used to concentrate on donation have grown 
to incorporate sustainable infrastructures necessary for the proper long-term eradication 
of disease burden in the world’s most impoverished nations. As these programs have 
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matured, additional emphasis has been placed on the maintainability of each intervention 
tied to individual government efforts. Due to high levels of success with programs that 
incorporate sustainability mechanisms, there has been a significant push by the global 
public health community to implement these programs. 
 Even the most successful programs, however, have inherent limitations that 
prohibit a fully realized plan to treat disease.  By committing to a sustainable framework, 
a program must engage in multiple partnerships to run and achieve that sustainability.  
These partnerships can take any form, and are often influenced by the sociocultural 
norms of those creating the partnerships. Depending on their construction, these 
partnerships have the ability to limit said public health interventions and unintentionally 
contribute to the isolation of marginalized segments of a population. Using Botswana’s 
public health intervention strategies for HIV/AIDs as a model, I will explore how key 
factors deemed essential for long-term sustainable healthcare programs have the potential 
to isolate and additionally harm certain segments of a population. In doing so, I will 
suggest that the concept of sustainability needs to be recast in a manner that achieves 
health for all segments of a population  
FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
The framework for this project is an in-depth exploration of Botswana’s HIV 
prevention and treatment program as a case study for the limitations of a sustainable 
healthcare intervention. I chose Botswana as a result of personal exposure during a 
summer internship in 2013. The research utilized in this paper draws upon 
anthropological theories of biopower and sociocultural norms, with original construction 
from on-the-ground interviews, conversations, and geopolitical interactions.   
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The first step towards creating this paper, prior to my departure, was through an 
in-depth academic deep dive into the Botswana-UPenn Partnership, which was my 
sponsoring organization. The partnership is a highly lauded program in the United States 
for its contribution to the eradication of HIV/AIDs in a highly prevalent country.    
Botswana, by all measures, was considered one of the greatest success stories of effective 
public-private partnerships. Botswana had all of the characteristics to make it a “perfect 
storm” of sustainable long-term partnership with a lasting ability to severely reduce the 
prevalence rate of HIV/AIDs in the country. The partnerships, which are a combined 
effort of ACHAP, PEPFAR, Merck, the University of Pennsylvania, and Harvard 
University, have become a model for other long-term sustainable intervention schemes.  
Through very strong relationships with the national government of Botswana, these 
players have established the infrastructure necessary for the government to continue their 
work when they leave. On paper, and through my pre-research, Botswana seemed to be 
an ideal place to make an impact and observe success on an untold scale.  
My experience on the ground told a very different story. The next defining step in 
the research of this paper was through my personal encounters within the country. I 
worked with the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and AIDs (BONELA), an 
organization that fights and advocates for equal rights for marginalized groups across 
Botswana. It concentrates on three key demographics: HIV positive individuals 
(heterosexual), homosexuals (MSM, transgender), and the sex work population. While on 
the ground, I worked with SISONKE, an organization run by sex workers for sex 
workers.  
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Sex work in Botswana is a criminalized activity, an important factor that 
influenced my ability to research effectively and equitably. My placement with an 
organization that operates illegally within the country revealed tremendous obstacles, 
stigma, and a very different outlook on the HIV/AIDs crisis for some of the most 
vulnerable populations. The “criminal activity” of my organization, and those it tried to 
help, completely prevented both parties from providing and accessing the very programs 
lauded by the international community. Inherent social schemas and the legal system 
made it impossible or even criminally offensive for the sex workers I engaged with to 
obtain the treatments that were saving the men and women they serviced on a nightly 
basis. Additionally, the government did not, and still does not, accurately disclose the 
influence of HIV/AIDS on these marginalized populations. In data released by the 
government, it often only listed heterosexual populations, significantly skewing the 
relative comparison points for other countries impacted by HIV. More comprehensive 
data comes from international HIV progress reports, including UNAIDS and WHO, 
which often states the limits of the data sets if certain populations are excluded.  These 
limitations are included throughout this paper.  
The methodology for the initial fact-finding of this project was done in a 
particularly atypical way. The argument for this paper came well into my assignment as I 
became more familiar with the social injustices towards sex workers and the structural 
boundaries keeping them as second-class citizens. Supporting interviews were from 
project assignments and were loosely translated with an interpreter as necessary. These 
interviews, which will be discussed in the section titled “The Isolated: Words from the 
Sufferers,” span a two month period with a core group of sex workers engaged with 
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SISONKE. As such, the primary foundations for the call to reassess the effectiveness of 
overall sustainable healthcare infrastructure is both through initial personal interviews, 
with most support stemming from country (or lack thereof) data. Due to the limited 
nature of my on-the-ground exposure once I fully engaged with the effects of sustainable 
infrastructure on marginalized populations, a more holistic view of the epidemic, with a 
concentration of the history of HIV, its trajectory in Africa, and the impacts of HIV on 
marginalized populations has been included.   
THE EVOLUTION OF SUSTAINABLE HEALTHCARE INFRASTRUCTURE IN HIV 
PROGRAMS 
 
A Brief History of HIV and Treatments 
 
 In the summer of 1981, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control published the first 
two reports about increases in formerly rare infections among gay men in New York and 
California through the Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report (MMWR). (1981: 305) It 
stated that, "Physicians should be alert for Kaposi's sarcoma, [Pneumocystis carinii] 
pneumonia, and other opportunistic infections associated with immunosuppression in 
homosexual men." (MMWR 1981: 307) From that day, extensive research about AIDS 
has continued in an attempt to combat the deadliest epidemic in recent history. (Shernoff 
& Smith 2001)  
Characterized as an immunodeficiency retrovirus, HIV inhibits the body’s 
immune response to infection. HIV replicates by infecting CD4+ cells (also known as t-
cells), which are integral to triggering the body’s immune system response to infection. 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2015) Through this process, the virus 
destroys the CD4+ cell, and reduces the person’s ability to fight infection and makes him 
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more vulnerable to illness.  (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2015) The 
lower a person’s CD4+ cell count, the more likely he is to contract disease; eventually, 
when HIV permanently suppresses the immune system, the person is diagnosed with 
AIDS and considered to have a significantly damaged immune system. (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 2015) 
In 1986, five years after the first reported incident of HIV, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first antiviral drug zidovudine (ZDV; AZT) 
that inhibits the activity of the reverse transcriptase enzyme to prevent the replication of 
HIV. (Manos & Horn 1998) Part of the class of drugs more formally known as nucleoside 
analog reverse transcriptase inhibitors, AZT and its immediate successors created the first 
anti-HIV arsenal. (Manos & Horn 1998) After 1991, a new class of anti-HIV drugs that 
were more quickly activated once inside the bloodstream, called non-nucleoside analog 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors, was introduced as the main anti-HIV drug. (Manos & 
Horn 1998) The final initial drug to be developed early within the epidemic was a class of 
antiviral drugs known as protease inhibitors. (Manos & Horn 1998) Distinctly different 
from the reverse transcriptase inhibitors, this drug attacked cells already infected cells 
and prevented them from producing more copies of virus. (Finzi et al 1997: 1295)  
Despite this growth of drug options, between 1986 and 1995, the standard 
antiviral therapy for HIV-infected individuals remained a single drug "monotherapy" 
treatment due to the costs associated with producing the other inhibitors. The 
monotherapy treatments appeared to be semi-efficacious, with significant variation in 
effectiveness among individuals. (Finzi et al 1997: 1296) At the same time, scientists 
were able to make crucial advances in the understanding of mechanisms of HIV in the 
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body. Scientists were able to discern that HIV replicated throughout the entire period of 
infection, even if no symptoms were manifesting, rather than each individual going 
through a latency period of ten years or more after the initial infection. (Finzi et al 1997: 
1296) Instead of AIDS surfacing as a result of a resurgence of the latent HIV virus, it was 
instead the product of a slow “war of attrition between HIV and the host immune 
system.” (Shernoff & Smith 2001) 
Once the theory of persistent viral replication was predominantly accepted, 
scientists were better able to understand HIV’s proclivity for drug resistance over time. 
Such resistance generally occurs when a random mutation during the replication of HIV 
causes a small genetic change in the virus' RNA, which makes it less vulnerable to the 
effects of antiviral drugs. (Horn 1998) Drug resistance has the ability to render treatment 
less effective or completely ineffective, and seriously complicated the initial stages of 
HIV treatment over the long latency periods. (Horn 1998) Drug resistance can take two 
forms, cross-resistant (same class resistance) or multidrug resistance. (Horn 1998)  
After these resistances were discovered, monotherapy was of limited usefulness in 
long-term treatment of HIV due to the lack of long-term efficacy for treatment. The 
consistent development of multiple classes of drugs, however, made it possible to shift 
from monotherapy to combination therapy in which two or more drugs are used 
simultaneously. By combining multiple classes of drugs to target various resistance 
mechanisms, combination therapy became an effective long-term mechanism for treating 
HIV. Dramatic effects were seen after this switch, because "in essence, combination 
therapy suffocates mutated forms of HIV before they have a chance to flourish. For 
example, in a combination of ddI, d4T, and indinavir, a strain of HIV that is naturally 
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resistant to ddI will be kept in check by d4T and indinavir, while a strain of HIV that is 
resistant to indinavir will be kept in check by d4T and ddI". (Horn 1998)  When all 
classes of drugs to combat HIV are used together, including nucleoside analog drugs, 
non-nucleoside analog drugs, and protease inhibitors, the combination is referred to as 
"highly active antiretroviral therapy" or HAART. (Horn 1998)  
Physicians prescribe a wide variety of HAART treatments and combinations, and 
over time there has been evidence that certain combinations of one protease inhibitor and 
one or two other drugs have the ability to reduce the amount of the virus in the blood. 
(CDC and 1997) This prompts a bodily response to increase the number of CD4+ cells, 
and leads to improved health and well-being. (CDC 1997) Additionally, the increase in 
CD4+ cells minimizes the opportunity for new mutations that lead to drug-resistant 
strains of the virus. (CDC 1997) Combination therapy has since become the norm in 
patients with significant immunosuppression. (CDC 1997) Although there has been no 
definitively decided time to initiate therapy, most doctors agree that the decision to begin 
treatment must be based on the length of time since initial infection, current CD4+ cell 
count and viral load, clinical prognosis, side effect profile, and the individual's 
psychological readiness and motivation to begin and adhere to treatment. (Shernoff & 
Smith 2001) 	  
The Emergence of HIV in Africa 
 
 While HIV did not come to the world’s stage until the Mortality and Morbidity 
Weekly Report, epidemiologists studying the first outbreak of HIV estimate that in the 
early 1960’s roughly two thousand individuals had already contracted the disease in 
Africa. (Sample 2006) One of the earliest incidence cases was discovered from the 
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analysis of blood samples from a malaria research project taken from the Congo in 1959. 
(Motulsky et al 1966) Many consider West Africa the initial outbreak zone for HIV; 
migrating populations most likely carried the disease to Eastern Africa in the early 1970s 
from the West. The disease was not considered an epidemic in East Africa until the early 
1980s. (Serwadda et al 1985) 
 After HIV was introduced to Eastern Africa, transmission rates rapidly 
accelerated due to a combination of factors not seen in West Africa. These included 
widespread labor migration, which transmitted the disease easily across states; the low 
status of women, which often led to increased levels of nonconsensual sex; the higher 
ratio of men in urban populations, which is linked to higher utilization of sex workers and 
unprotected sex; lower circumcision rates, which is linked to easier STI transmission, and 
a higher prevalence of STIs, which indicates more radical fluid sexual behaviors. (Illiffe 
2006) Home to larger economic epicenters, Eastern Africa had larger city-based 
populations, which is considered a factor in accelerating disease spread. Additionally, 
researchers believe that the higher prevalence of sex workers in these epicenters 
contributed to the rapid spread of HIV; by 1986 in Nairobi, 85 percent of sex workers 
were infected. (Piot et al 1987) 
 While the epidemic level rates of infection were affecting the east, HIV was 
spreading further into Western Equatorial Africa with lower levels of prevalence. Many 
of the countries within the equatorial belt, including Cameroon, Gabon, and the Congo 
did not see high rates of HIV because of a lack of similar sexual networks seen in the east 
due to long distances between cities, poor travel conditions, and perpetual violence in the 
region. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) Professions that required extensive regional 
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travel (truck drivers, soldiers, miners, traders), however, rapidly spread the disease to 
distinct trade epicenters throughout the continent due to their engagement with sex 
workers along heavily populated transport routes. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) In the 
late 1980s, Ugandan truck drivers and military personnel from General Amin’s army had 
prevalence rates of 35 percent and 30 percent respectively. (Carswell et al 1989) In 1998, 
the second highest HIV prevalence rate reported was found among those living in the 
region surrounding the Tanzam Road, which connects Zambia to Tanzania. (Hiza 1988) 
Moving south rapidly through these newly afflicted travel routes, the epidemic reached 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.  
 
The Failures of Early HIV Treatment Programs in Africa 	  
 
With a few noteworthy exceptions, the 1980s were typified by a lackluster 
response to the African AIDS crisis. (Carael 2006) Many of the governments in Africa 
did not have the capacity to handle the immediate concern of HIV due economic growth 
in the region, political crises, and consistent war. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) During 
the initial stages of the epidemic, with no treatment or cure in sight, governments needed 
to focus on preventative measures for transmission. Fighting against long-standing 
cultural norms, these prevention efforts included revising sexual behaviors, abstinence, 
correct condom usage, and encouraging faithfulness to partners. In many parts of Africa, 
religious authorities staunchly opposed these prevention efforts; both Christian and 
Muslim leaders directly contradicted the call for condom promotion and other prevention 
campaigns. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) In a report studying the early prevention 
programs in African countries, UNAIDS described, “The fear of offending powerful 
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religious constituencies… created gridlock in some national governments, and for good 
reason. Conservative lobbies have shown that they can obstruct everything from family 
life and education to condom promotion if they chose.” (1999) Across dozens of affected 
countries, senior politicians were hesitant to acknowledge a HIV/AIDS epidemic due to a 
fear of discouraging fledgling tourism sectors or creating widespread panic. (Sabatier 
1988)  
While the rest of the continent struggled, Senegal and Uganda are often regarded 
as countries that did respond the AIDS crisis rapidly and effectively. (Averting HIV and 
AIDS 2010) Currently, Senegal has one of the lowest rates of HIV prevalence in sub-
Saharan Africa. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) According to UNAIDS, while it is 
impossible to predict how the epidemic would have progressed in these countries without 
initial intervention, many credit the prompt response of the government and community 
leaders at the first signs of the epidemic with avoiding the fullest devastating effects of 
the epidemic. (1999) Uganda’s response began after the end of the country’s civil war in 
1986 and President Museveni pushed for a strong prevention program to combat the 26 
percent prevalence rate within the capital city. (Tumushabe 2006) Shortly after, in 1987, 
Uganda created an AIDS control program with the assistance of the WHO; this five-year 
framework, which concentrated on the principles of openness and frankness about the 
disease, received over US$30 million in donor funding and became a model for Africa 
HIV prevention programs. (Tumushabe 2006) 
Conversely, many other African nations responded negatively to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. In the Congo, President Mobutu banned the press from reporting on HIV from 
1983-1987. (Nolen 2007: 139) Zimbabwean doctors were mandated not to report AIDS 
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as a cause of death on death certificates. (Nolen 2007: 139) The Apartheid regime of 
South Africa refused to initiate a proposed AIDS education program in schools and did 
not acknowledge the danger of the country’s large-scale heterosexual epidemic until the 
late 1980s. (Grundlingh 1999) Even though the virus arrived in the region late, by 
comparison, the epidemic was devastating by the end of the decade with several southern 
African countries overtaking East Africa as the focus of the global HIV epidemic. 
(Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) 
The WHO was especially slow to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa 
because it did not consider AIDS to be the region’s primary healthcare concern. (Carael 
2006) In 1985, then Director-General Halfdan Mahler stated, “AIDS is not spreading like 
bush fire in Africa. It is malaria and other tropical diseases that are killing millions of 
children every day.” (Inrig 2010) While Malaria was physically killing more individuals 
in 1985, HIV was quickly surpassing the disease in terms of morbidity and new 
infections. (Inrig 2010) The following year, however, Mahler admitted the inaccuracies 
of this statement and noted that “[e]verything is getting worse and worse in AIDS and all 
of us have been underestimating it, and I in particular.” (Inrig 2010) The WHO Global 
Program for the Fight Against AIDS was started in 1986, and targeted to raise US$1.5 
billion a year to support prevention and educational endeavors, with a priority to focus in 
Africa. (Carael 2006)  
During the 1990’s, sub-Saharan Africa was the central focus of the HIV epidemic. 
In 1993, it is estimated that the region housed 9 million infected people out of a global 
total of 14 million. (WHO 1995: 2) By 1998, 70 percent of the people newly diagnosed 
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with HIV resided in sub-Saharan Africa, with 14 percent of these infections occurring in 
South Africa. (UNAIDS 1998)  
The first highly effective treatment for HIV, HAART, was introduced to the 
developed world in 1996. (Porter et al 2003) HAART, also known as ART, was so 
effective in this region that AIDS death rates dropped by 84 percent over the next four 
years. (Porter et al 2003) As a result, many scientists declared, "aggressive treatment with 
multiple drugs can convert deadly AIDS into a chronic, manageable disorder like 
diabetes." (Maugh 1996) At a cost of $10,000-15,000 per person per year, however, 
many sub-Saharan countries would have incurred costs of nine percent to 67 percent of 
their GDP to provide 100% government funded HAART therapy to everybody in their 
countries living with HIV. (UNAIDS 1998) Impossible for the majority of African 
nations, many started to advocate for more affordable options to help those in the 
socioeconomic classes too poor to afford treatment. South Africa was one of the first 
countries to lobby many Western multi-billion-dollar pharmaceutical corporations to 
either allow for compulsory licensing (local production of these HIV/AIDS drugs 
themselves) or to allow for parallel importation of these drugs from countries that were 
producing generics. Secondarily, HAART treatment was clinically demanding and many 
governments did not have adequate healthcare infrastructure to manage large-scale 
treatment programs. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) In the 1980-1990s, sub-Saharan 
Africa had the world’s lowest level of social security cover, which includes access to 
health services and doctor/patient ratio. (Carael 2006)  
From the first reported cases of HIV through the development of HAART, Africa 
was mired by limited resources and an inadequate plan of attack to combat the epidemic.  
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The lack of response and acknowledgement of HIV allowed the disease to spread to 
epidemic proportions by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Sub-Saharan Africa 
created a need for a highly effective prevention and treatment program, which countries 
around the world continually attempted to create and innovate to stem the effects of HIV 
on afflicted countries.  
 
The Call For a New Type of Program 	  	  
 At the turn of the century, it was clear that a new course of action was needed to 
combat the spread of HIV. Previous plans of attack were failing most populations, and 
global health programs were struggling to fill the gap in ART provision. In 2000, as a 
result of mounting pressure to increase access to AIDS medications worldwide, five 
pharmaceutical companies offered to begin negotiations for steep price reductions for 
HIV drugs in the world’s poorest regions. (McNeil 2000) The production of generic 
drugs by India and Brazil and other local producers sparked a “price war” between major 
producers like GlaxoSmithKline and country-sponsored generics. (McNeil 2000) While 
the negotiations were lengthy, the early 2000s saw drastic price reductions by the world’s 
largest drug manufacturers. These companies frequently cut prices on patented AIDS 
drugs until they were comparatively priced to newly produced, off-patent generics. 
(Hirschler 2001)   
 As HIV treatments became more affordable, many countries began facing intense 
skepticism regarding the feasibility of rolling out widespread ARV treatment to afflicted 
individuals in Africa. Many African countries had weak healthcare infrastructure; in 
2005, Africa had a shortage of over 1 million health workers. (WHO 2006) A second, but 
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equally important concern, focused on a potential patient’s inability to properly adhere to 
the prescribed treatment. (WHO 2006) Critics of equal access of HIV treatment 
questioned if it was cost-effective to provide ARTs to those in “less developed” regions. 
The latter concern was later proven to be unfounded; HIV positive patients in sub-
Saharan Africa have since been found to have higher rates of adherence than patients in 
America. (WHO 2006) A final, major concern surrounded the physical delivery of drugs 
into hard-hit but remote regions of Africa. (Powell 2009) In 2001, it was estimated that 
over 20 million people in sub-Saharan Africa were living with AIDS, but only 8,000 were 
accessing proper treatments. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) 
 The hardest hit countries required a new way to contain the epidemic, and the 
international community began to look at options for extensive financial and medical 
support. The health sector in many sub-Saharan African countries had insufficient 
budgets and minimal resources to combat the disease in a manageable way in comparison 
to their western counterparts. (Nolen 2007: 108) In 2003, the WHO announced the “ by 
5” initiative, which strove to put 3 million individuals in developing countries on ARVs 
by 2005. (World Health Organization 2006) The initiative contained provisions for 
funding and infrastructure improvement, along with quality assurance provisions and the 
goal of global alliances. (World Health Organization 2006) Even though these goals were 
not met, the campaign was able to increase the number of people on treatment in Africa.  
It also raised political support and additional financial commitment by Western nations 
for HIV/AIDS in these resource-poor countries. The turn of the century brought about 
increased cash flows by many developed nations to help scale-up existing programs and 
build new ones. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010) In 2001, The Global Fund to Fight 
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AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created. Shortly after, U.S. President George Bush 
announced his plan named the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
which would be one of the largest endeavors to fight AIDS by a single nation. (The 
White House 2003) Initially, the $15-billion aid package was designed to help eradicate 
HIV/AIDs in low-income countries over a five-year period. (Barney et al 2010: 9) The 
program, whose influence on individual country programs will be discussed later, is 
currently in its fourth iteration and continues to work towards eradication in low-income 
countries.  
 While many developed nations were willing to provide significant funding, and 
eventually treatment, significant challenges remained to treat the majority of populations.  
Third party interventions needed to integrate and bolster existing healthcare systems. 
When considering the size of the epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, no international 
organization could provide the manpower necessary to fight the disease. The funding and 
drugs were in place, but the lack of health care infrastructure and inadequate human 
capital made it necessary for a new type of program to surface: the sustainable integrated 
healthcare intervention.   
 
Sustainability: The Perfect Intervention Scheme? 
 
The concept of sustainability is equated with the use of financial resources to 
build health care infrastructure and work force that can form the backbone of a delivery 
system. Infrastructure and work force can also be measured and so provides a metric by 
which to evaluate the many types of health care programs put forward for funding 
consideration. Successful sustainable public healthcare programs in the global south 
	   17	  
integrate and leverage resource-backed initiatives with existing programs creating 
partnerships to improve previously established, or build entirely new, infrastructure and 
delivery mechanisms. The cooperation of non-profit organizations, community entities, 
and government programs are all essential factors in ensuring the success of new 
interventions to combat widespread epidemic disease burdens. (Asad et al 2012) When 
considered separately, each factor is purportedly ineffective in creating significant change 
in prevalence rates among populations. Without integration, non-profit organizations bear 
the vast majority of the burden of supporting the world’s poorest because many of these 
governments “lack the funding and resources to actively contribute to desired 
intervention mechanisms.” (Asad et al 2012) Conventional wisdom in the global health 
“beltway” is that “it is prohibitively expensive and logistically burdensome for 
governmental organizations to provide health care in resource-poor settings.” (Asad et al 
2012) In order for an intervention to be successful, government contribution is requisite 
in building public health infrastructure in any developing nation. (Asad et al 2012) Such 
involvement provides credibility and logistical support for nonprofits and public-private 
partnerships that operate within the country under various aims and objectives. Local 
legislative oversight also promotes responsibility among those working in their own 
communities.  Community entities, or grassroots movements, are also essential to 
promote a ground-up approach to preventing, treating, and even living with deadly 
disease. These entities provide additional avenues in areas where NGOs and the 
government cannot effectively operate. Working in tandem, all three actors help 
contribute to the success of a sustainable healthcare intervention.  
	   18	  
According to the WHO, eradication efforts have shown to be “most effective 
when a significant number of groups in both private and public sectors coordinate their 
efforts and holistically tackle a particular disease with pragmatic solidarity.” (World 
Health Organization 2008) The public sector in this model of pragmatic partnership, 
often tied to the private sector for funding support, will initiate, fund, and ensure 
sustainability of equitable health care programs by “building effective health systems in 
resource-poor settings while improving the skills and capacities of non-profit 
organizations.” (Moten et al 2008) Additionally, by using this form of cooperative 
agreement, the public sector works to increase access to competent providers, through 
health training and medication provided by the private sector, to their populations. 
(World Health Organization 2008) Integration of local and national governments with 
NGOs and (most consistently) public-private partnerships to provide medications, 
delivery systems, initial funding, and public support create more traction within local 
communities than separately approached mechanisms. (Moten et al 2012) Sustainable, 
successful interventions aim to incorporate all of these factors into one healthcare 
strategy to improve health in the communities they serve. Seemingly perfect, these 
interventions are designed to exist equally across all communities. In reality, however, 
each intervention is subject to the sociocultural norms in the country it operates setting 
the stage for inequity.   
A problem arises when the national government heavily influences such a 
healthcare strategy. Achieving health for the community at large can easily devolve into 
the isolation of specific marginalized groups, depending on the public policy of the 
government. As exemplified in Botswana, based on the construction of the sociocultural 
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and religious beliefs within the country, the government recast sustainability such that it 
did not apply to those deemed unworthy of treatment. The overarching cultural and 
political implications that result significantly impairs the efficacy of the sustainable 
practices deemed successful by local and national organizations alike.  
BOTSWANA: THE CASE FOR INTGRATED PUBLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES 
 
In order to understand the impact of a seemingly sustainable healthcare 
infrastructure on the epidemic in Botswana, it is important to comprehend the original 
steps taken by the country as HIV emerged. As will be delineated, the initial action by the 
country and its situational factors made it an outwardly perfect opportunity for 
international support and potential program replication for other equally devastated 
countries.   
 
A History of HIV in Botswana 	   	  
Botswana reported its first case of AIDS in 1985. The country's subsequent 
response to the emerging HIV and AIDS epidemic can be divided into three “precursor” 
stages and the current course of action, called the Term Plans. The different stages were 
subsequently adapted due to under realized goals set by the plans. The first, early stage 
(1987-89) concentrated on eliminating the risk of HIV transmission through blood 
transfusions by screening blood donations. (Government of Botswana 2014) The second 
stage (1989-97), and the first Medium Term Plan (MTP) introduced information, 
education, and communication programming. (Government of Botswana 2014) This 
response, while more encompassing, was still very narrowly focused. During the second 
stage in 1993, the government created and adopted the Botswana National Policy on 
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AIDS. (Government of Botswana 2014) The third and final precursor stage, (1997-2002), 
significantly expanded the response to HIV/AIDS to include more holistic education, 
prevention, and comprehensive care programs in addition to providing ARV treatment to 
the entire HIV positive population. (Government of Botswana 2014) The second Medium 
Term Plan (MTP II), introduced after the end of the third stage, aspired to engage more 
previously excluded stakeholders. It was aimed at not only reducing HIV infection and 
transmission rates, but also reducing the impact of HIV and AIDS at every level of 
society. (Government of Botswana 2014) While these programs were admirable, they 
were insufficient in addressing the rapidly rising prevalence rate among the Batswana 
(individuals from Botswana).  
In an attempt to create a more comprehensive plan to combat HIV, the 
government commissioned the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA). Since 
2003, it has coordinated Botswana’s existing response through a national multi-sectoral 
framework and formed the international partnerships currently supporting the country’s 
intervention mechanism. NACA is responsible for mobilizing the country’s long-term 
response to HIV/AIDS and coordinating the response with the country’s many 
international partners. (Government of Botswana 2014)  The National AIDS Council, 
which supervises NACA, is chaired by the President and has representative members 
from across the various sociocultural realms in the country, including both public and 
private sectors. (Government of Botswana 2014)  The First National Strategic Framework 
(2003-2009) spearheaded the initial multi-sectoral national response, precisely outlining 
the implementation responsibilities of all partners and sectors involved and subsequently 
providing them with a clear set of structures and guidance. (Government of Botswana 
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2014) The first framework created a number of developments that included provisions for 
routine HIV testing, increased Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) centers, and 
access to ARVs through the public sector. (Government of Botswana 2014) 
The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Botswana’s Intervention Mechanisms 	  	  
The Republic of Botswana has implemented a sustainable, long-term intervention, 
which was executed through a cooperative multilateral approach that incorporates all 
aspects of  “successful” intervention mechanisms. Public health officials around the 
world have lauded Botswana’s program, which uses a unique combination of public-
private partnerships (both NGO and community based programs with international 
backing) and government involvement for its statistical successes. Prior to the 
involvement of any third party or international support, Botswana had a 38.9 percent HIV 
prevalence rate for adults, the second highest in sub-Saharan Africa. (Wester et al 2009: 
501) The government of Botswana and its partners worked in tandem to foster and 
support a revolutionary public health intervention designed to reduce the burden of HIV 
in their country.  
Botswana’s public-private partnerships led to the development of a national HIV 
treatment program through community-based networks, with a reduction in HIV 
prevalence to 29 percent; the highest reduction among effected nations within the region. 
(Wester et al 2009: 503) Theoretically, this level of success indicates an optimal 
sustainable program for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS that cooperatively 
works with community members, national governments, and private actors. However, 
when considering the efficacy of Botswana’s HIV/ AIDS intervention, it is important to 
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note the significance of several underlying factors that likely contributed to its success in 
comparison to other sub-Saharan countries: the commitment of the country’s highest 
leaders to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic; a small population; a relatively well-developed 
health infrastructure; a relatively peaceful political environment; and a middle-income 
country status. These factors created the perfect backbone for an intervention program. 
(Ilavenil & Reich 2006: 397) The essential “starting point” for the country created the 
necessary platform for many organizations to implement pilot programs and identify the 
variable success factors of those ventures. It is impossible to know if Botswana would 
have been awarded similar attention by potential partners without these factors in place.  
Without the combination of factors present in Botswana and the mechanisms built into 
the intervention to promote long-term growth, the intervention would have likely failed. 
The partnerships were able to capitalize on the willingness of a nation, revolutionize care 
models, and serve as change-makers within the global health field giving this partnership 
trailblazer status in the world of sustainable healthcare ventures.  
Two main forms of public-private partnerships have become staples in the 
Botswana sustainable intervention plan: philanthropic and academic. Addressing funding 
needs, the philanthropic partnerships often provides the monetary resources necessary to 
jumpstart comprehensive programming. Academic partnerships, whose actors are usually 
western-based healthcare systems, help provide training and on-the-ground support to 
administer and treat those afflicted by disease.  Encompassing the public and private 
sector approaches deemed necessary for successful intervention mechanisms, the 
cooperative engagement of both types of partnerships has been integral to the success of 
the Botswana intervention and thus serves as useful case studies. Due to the inability for a 
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sustainable program to succeed without both the philanthropic and academic sectors of 
the partnerships, co-dependence within the private partnership field has further 
influenced the relationship of government to partners. Exhibiting a dynamic relationship, 
the different partnerships work collaboratively with the government of Botswana to 
utilize resources effectively and achieve success through cooperation. The power 
dynamics of the relationship are directly correlated with the acceptance of each arm’s 
respective position in the larger scheme for success of the intervention. Through the 
variable bio-political forces exhibited by both the philanthropic and academic forms, the 
situational factors behind Botswana’s success and sustainability mechanisms become 
even more pronounced. (Ilavenil & Reich 2006: 298) Each form has a main actor; the 
Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) provides funding, drug 
donations, and infrastructure development, while the UPenn-Botswana Partnership (BUP) 
provides training and educational programs. One additional actor, PEPFAR, which 
provides financial support, has specific guidelines for treatment provisions necessary for 
required funding. By working in tandem, all actors have been essential in the successes 
achieved through the extended engagement of all of Botswana’s situational factors and 
cooperation with the government for extended logistical planning.   
One of the hallmark efforts created by ACHAP and the government of Botswana 
that directly targeted long-term sustainability was the planning, financing and 
implementation of MASA – a Setswana word meaning “new dawn” – the national 
treatment program. The inherent need for quick action, pressure from the country’s most 
powerful leaders, and a desire for success led to a rapid implementation of a national 
program through private entities, in order to gain the funding necessary for such a 
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program. MASA, as a treatment and prevention model, has been extremely successful. 
The rollout model, completed in 2004, involved the completion of 32 sites, defined as 
hospitals with accompanying clinics that provided antiretroviral therapy (ARVT) services 
at various levels. (Gilles 1998) Successes of the program include improved access to 
ARV services through the sites and out-sourcing contingencies to private practitioners for 
fast-tracked enrollment into the program resulting in reduced congestion at government 
treatment sites; reduced morbidity associated with HIV and AIDS (as noted through a 
decline in patients in need of Community Home Based Care (CHBC) from 12,000 to 
3,500); increased survival rates for patients on highly active antiretroviral treatment 
programs (HAART), with an estimated 50,000 averted deaths and an 88.6 percent 
survival rate for those adherent to the program; the stabilization of the orphan population 
due to the reduced mortality of parents; and increased collaboration for intensive and 
extensive training for health care providers in order to ensure effective and efficient 
implementation of MASA. (Jackson & Claeye 2011: 194) These outcomes, at the surface, 
are indicative of a program internationally recognized as “a case study for success.” After 
initial support from ACHAP and close collaboration with the government, MASA can be 
run solely by the government of Botswana, highlighting the successes of an integrated 
approach to long-term sustainable intervention mechanisms.  
The delicate balance of private sector management and government actions have 
become defining characteristics of the Botswana model. The intervention mechanism was 
designed to create primary infrastructure and subsequently support the national 
framework when the third parties are withdrawn from the country. The organizations 
behind ACHAP sourced the perfect case study and saw tremendous growth. The variable, 
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and consequently, bio-political impact of the top-down partnership is emphasized in 
ACHAP’s outcomes. Each outcome was shaped by the influence of the philanthropic 
partnerships, inherently ignoring the need for primary creation by the afflicted nation. 
(Jackson & Claeye 2011: 194) ACHAP’s involvement with Botswana’s ARV program 
directly demonstrates how public-private partnerships can be advantageous in initiating a 
major HIV/AIDS intervention; Botswana now has more people on ARV treatment than 
any other country in sub-Saharan Africa and is the only country providing free treatment 
for “all.” (Ilavenil & Reich 2005) The ACHAP partnership has played a vital role in 
attaining these outcomes.  It has created a viable, long-term sustainable intervention 
scheme with the capacity to serve as a model for countries with similar baseline disease 
burden.   
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF SUSTAINABILITY 	  	  
While the actions of the government of Botswana have become a hallmark of 
success in national HIV/ AIDS treatment programs worldwide, it is important to 
understand how it engaged with various international public and private partners to create 
a series of provisional, limiting agreements that prohibit equitable treatment throughout 
the country. By engaging in such limiting agreements with the African Comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS Partnership and supplemental funding sources through PEPFAR, the 
Government of Botswana has simultaneously created a sustainable HIV treatment 
program and a mechanism to isolate and further marginalize key populations in need of 
treatment within the country. Thus, the same factors that contribute to its sustainability, 
namely government regulations, create a program that isolates high-risk groups and 
perpetuates the prevalence of HIV/AIDs in highly marginalized groups.  
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The Effect of HIV on Sex Workers and MSM 	  	  
 Across the globe, HIV disproportionately affects key populations that are defined 
as sex workers, men who have sex with men (MSM) and intravenous drug users (IDUs).  
Worldwide, these populations account for a significant share of new infections on a 
yearly basis, and are especially prominent in areas of generalized epidemiology. 
(UNAIDS 2013) For the purpose of this paper, the subject groups of marginalized 
populations will focus on sex workers and MSM.   
 HIV continues to seriously impact female, male, and transgender sex workers.  
Female sex workers are 13.5 times more likely to be infected with HIV than women who 
are not engaged in the profession, and global sero-prevalence rates (reported) have 
increased overall. (Kerrigan et al 2013) In sub-Saharan Africa, the median prevalence 
rate for sex workers is 20 percent, compared to a global median of 3.9 percent. (UNAIDS 
2014) In West African countries, it is estimated that up to 32 percent of new infections 
were attributable to sex work; in Swaziland, Zambia, and Uganda, it is estimated that 7-
11 percent of new infections are due to active sex workers, their clients, and their clients’ 
regular partners. (UNAIDS 2013)  Although median HIV prevalence rates vary 
regionally, from 22 percent (Southern and Eastern Africa) to 17 percent (Western and 
Central Africa), these rates are higher than for the reported general populations. 
(UNAIDS 2013) According to the GAP Report, nine reporting countries, all in sub-
Saharan Africa, had higher rates of HIV prevalence among sex workers than the general 
population. (UNAIDS 2014) Data is not readily available about this key population due 
to the stigma usually associated, and in 2013, UNAIDS reported that HIV prevalence 
among sex workers “remains extremely high in many countries worldwide.” (UNAIDS) 
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According to the World Bank, HIV prevalence among sex workers in sub-Saharan 
Africa remains a key factor in determining the direction and effect of the epidemic 
worldwide. (Kerrigan et al 2013) In a 2013 report on sex work, it was estimated that sub-
Saharan Africa has the highest pooled HIV prevalence rate at 36.6 percent. (Kerrigan et 
al) Service levels for HIV prevention and treatment amongst female sex workers are 
considerably low, less than 50 percent in most reportable countries; similar programs are 
almost nonexistent for male and transgender sex workers. (Kerrigan et al 2013) However, 
inadequate financing for sex-work focused HIV prevention programming is a divisive 
factor in why this prevention coverage continues to be extremely low. (UNAIDS 2013)  
Regardless of a sex worker’s disproportionate risk of contracting HIV, global funding 
remains insignificant for this category. (UNAIDS 2013) In many regions, international 
funding for prevention efforts exceeds that of national funding for HIV treatment in sex 
workers (Figure 1). 
This may be due to the highly stigmatized nature of sex work, which in many 
countries with high prevalence rates is criminalized or even illegal. One notable 
exception is Southern Africa, partially attributable to prevention programs created by 
South Africa, where sex work is decriminalized. (UNAIDS 2013) The World Bank report 
identified three key policy recommendations based on effective country data to reduce 
HIV prevalence in sex workers: scaled-up community empowerment, HIV prevention 
services, and earlier ART initiation; interactive relationships between sex worker’s rights 
organizations and governments; violence reduction against active sex workers. (Kerrigan 
et al 2013) It is believed that if countries were to adopt these policies or actions, there 
could be a significant reduction of HIV prevalence in sex workers.  There is little 
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movement, however, in regions with the most devastating effects of HIV to adopt these 
changes and strive toward additional treatment equality.  
 MSM, globally, have a HIV prevalence rate of 7-18 percent, and are 19 times 
more likely to have HIV than other men. (UNAIDS 2014) The MSM populations in 
Western and Central Africa (18 percent) and Southern and Eastern Africa (14 percent), or 
the regions with the highest MSM HIV prevalence rates, are significant contributors to 
regional epidemics. (UNAIDS 2013) As in the case of sex workers, epidemiological 
surveys of men who have sex with men are limited and may not be nationally 
representative. Regionally, epidemiological trends vary for MSM, and prevalence has 
been increasing for the global MSM population. (UNAIDS 2013) Conversely to sex 
workers, MSM typically contract HIV at a young age; in the 20 countries reporting age-
disaggregated data, the median prevalence is 15 percent for MSM that are 25 years and 
older. (UNAIDS 2014)  
There have been some advancements in appropriately creating treatment and 
prevention plans for men who have sex with men. Recent studies indicate ARV-based 
HIV prevention methods, including pre-exposure antiretroviral prophylaxis, can offer 
improved prevention efforts for MSM; however, this model comes with limited side-
effects and potential long-term effects that must still be assessed. According to the 
UNAIDS 2013 report, survey data shows that “MSM often have extremely limited access 
to condoms, water-based lubricants, HIV education and support for sexual risk 
reduction.” (UNAIDS 2013) In order to properly combat the effects of this stigma and 
discrimination, a global health priority must be to increase the access of MSM to 
culturally sensitive counseling, testing services, and ARV treatment.  
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MSM are likely deterred from accessing mainstream health services due to fear of 
disapproval and discrimination by health care providers. According to the UNAIDS GAP 
Report, the percentage of MSM reached by prevention programs from 2009 to 2012 
hovered between 52-54 percent. (2014) This report, in which only 20 countries disclosed 
data for MSM, indicated that global estimates may actually be lower for access to care. 
(UNAIDS 2014) As with sex workers, inadequate resources hinder the ability to reach 
afflicted or at-risk MSM prevention services. As can be seen in Figure 2, while 
international funding greatly outweighs domestic funding for MSM programs, it is still 
extremely limited in sub-Saharan Africa. (UNAIDS 2014) 
  According to UNAIDS, the effects of limited funding are “compounded by a host 
of additional challenges, including the deterrent effects of homophobia on the ability or 
willingness of men who have sex with men to seek essential HIV services.” Punitive 
laws, which occur disproportionately in sub-Saharan Africa, regarding same-sex sexual 
relations strongly contribute to an inherent climate of intolerance and fear of treatment.   
For sex workers and men who have sex with men, both with a higher risk of 
acquiring HIV, programmatic deficits are amalgamated by societal and legal 
disadvantages that increase overall vulnerability and subsequently discourage these 
populations from securing the services they need.   
The Role of PEPFAR as a Limiting Agent on These Populations 	  	  
One of the other key limiting factors in the provision of fully inclusive HIV 
medication, is the President’s Emergency Plan for Relief (PEPFAR) program. 
Announced by President Bush in 2003, the  $15-billion aid package was designed to help 
eradicate HIV/AIDs in low-income countries over a five-year period. (Barney et al 2010: 
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9) The program focused on fifteen detrimentally affected nations that account for over 50 
percent HIV infections worldwide; these "focus countries" were Vietnam, Haiti, Guyana, 
and twelve countries in sub-Saharan Africa. (Barney et al 2010: 11) Initially, PEPFAR 
aimed to attack the HIV epidemic through a three-prong process: providing ART 
treatment to infected individuals in resource-limited settings, preventing new infections 
in these settings, and supporting care for currently infected individuals. Originally, the 
program set out to affect 20 million people by 2010. (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
2014) By 2008, PEPFAR had provided ART treatment for over 1.2 million Africans, up 
from 50,000 at the start of the program in 2004. (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
2014) 
PEPFAR has many limiting requirements that reflect the conservative views of 
President Bush and congress at the time. In order for a country to be eligible for funding, 
PEPFAR required that 20 percent of the funds given to the country be spent on 
prevention programs, and an additional 30 percent had to be devoted to enhancing 
"abstinence until marriage and fidelity to a single partner” programs. (Shelton et al 2004: 
891) The program recommended that only those who participate in "risky behavior," 
namely truck drivers, sex workers, and HIV sero-discordant (infected) couples, use 
condoms as a way to combat HIV/AIDS. (Shelton et al 2004: 891) No country could 
negotiate a contract with PEPFAR without first proving adherence to these stipulations.  
In 2005, Bush administration officials refined the requirements for PEPFAR 
support. The new stipulations required that all groups, both foreign and American, 
tackling HIV/AIDS issues proclaim their opposition to sex work and prostitution to 
receive this funding through an “anti-prostitution pledge”. (Dussault 2008) This new 
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PEPFAR pledge prohibited organizations from accessing significant funding 
opportunities that did not actively condemn prostitution or sex work. Many social 
activists that emphasize the need for free expression in treatment for the epidemic due to 
complex social structures inherent in the disease process believe that this policy not only 
violates the rights of these organizations, but also of their constituents. (Kinney 2006: 
158) This pledge, fully integrated into PEPFAR, obstructs the treatment of commercial 
sex workers, a key group in need of HIV/AIDS care. By preventing this group from 
accessing (in most cases) free medical treatment, PEPFAR is violating the rights of this 
key group and further increasing their risk of death by the disease because these sex 
workers are unable to seek out care in highly afflicted nations.  
PEPFAR recognizes that the sex worker population has an increased sero-
prevalence rate of HIV; it concedes that, “persons who engage in socially stigmatized 
behaviors, including sex work…are at a disproportionately higher risk for HIV.” 
(PEPFAR Technical Working Groups 2011) PEPFAR, however, centers its efforts on 
“engaging in targeted prevention, care, and treatment outreach for prostitutes; helping 
governments to support alternatives to prostitution; and working to reduce demand for 
prostitution.” (Center for Health and Gender Equity 2011) While PEPFAR does intend to 
provide some resources to help this group, it also seeks to completely eradicate 
prostitution worldwide. The program states that any partner organization must reject all 
funding proposals or programs that are seen as legitimizing the practice of sex work. 
(Dussault 2008) While certain aspects of PEPFAR’s work do aim to help sex workers 
acquire ART treatment, by requiring organizations to utilize provisional statements that 
decries the “legality and morality of prostitution, PEPFAR in fact hinders the ability of 
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sex workers to receive the highest quality of HIV treatment.” (Dussault 2008) These 
outcomes, due to the process of establishing contracts and key documents for sex workers 
to qualify for treatment, highlight the neglected stakeholders of the agreement.  
PEPFAR has endorsed an HIV/AIDS construct similar to that of sex workers for 
MSM. While many of the barriers exist at the country level, PEPFAR’s original mandate 
in 2004 imposed similar stringent resource allocation requirements for MSM. The most 
recent iteration of PEPFAR’s mandate has included significant expansion of supported 
MSM programming and long-term commitments from PEPFAR leadership. HIV/AIDS 
services through PEPFAR and other providers, however, remain insufficient to combat 
the epidemic for MSM.  (UNAIDS 2014)  Under current limitations and funding 
provisions, there is a significant dearth of interventions that have the ability to tackle the 
social, legal, religious, and political barriers that would allow for MSM to equally access 
HIV health services. (Averting HIV and AIDS 2014) 
Multiple studies have shown that, in a fashion similar to sex workers, grassroots 
organizations remain the most effective form of responses to provide HIV/AIDS services 
to MSM. There is an immense opportunity for international donor programs, including 
PEPFAR as well as long-standing government interventions to build and expand these 
programs. (amfAR 2010) In a recent report by amfAR, which studied the effectiveness of 
PEPFAR’s MSM programs in eight countries, it stated that even though substantial 
funding had been introduced to help MSM, a lack of structural support was actually 
inhibiting and undermining efforts in the PEPFAR-run programs. (2010) 
PEPFAR has made strides in accommodating MSM in its long-term strategy. In 
2008, PEPFAR’s reauthorization legislation acknowledged the importance of providing 
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support for MSM, and called for the  “appropriate HIV/AIDS education programs and 
training targeted to prevent the transmission of HIV among [MSM].”  (amfAR 2010) 
Released in 2009, PEPFAR’s Five-Year Strategy recognized the disproportionate impact 
of HIV on MSM and stated that governments are “often reluctant to engage in outreach to 
these communities.”  (amfAR 2010)  The plan commits to address such discrimination 
and stigma against MSM, and also to support targeted HIV treatment and prevention 
services. (UNAIDS 2014) While these actions are commendable by the organization, 
limited effectiveness continues to hinder on the ground efforts. Due to inadequate data of 
HIV prevalence among MSM, and details of targeted country programming, PEPFAR’s 
structural limitations continue to marginalize this key group.  
A second major actor that contributes to the isolation of key groups in Botswana 
with PEPFAR is the Government itself. Comprised of multiple actors responsible for 
contractual negotiations with PEPFAR, the partnership is often looked at as a cornerstone 
of international HIV/AIDS treatment programs. In 1995, the first partnership was 
established between the Government of Botswana and the United States Center for 
Disease Control (CDC/BOTUSA). (Stash et al 2012)  A research outpost, BOTUSA 
conducts both treatment and population-based research on TB and HIV. It also supplies 
multiple layers of financial and technical support to fight the epidemic through PEPFAR. 
(Government of Botswana 2010) From the inception of the partnership in 2004, 
Botswana has received over US$390 million to supplement and support successful 
HIV/AIDS capacity, treatment, and care activities. (Government of Botswana 2010) 
Through extensive PEPFAR assistance, the United States Government has played 
a crucial role in diminishing the impact of HIV/AIDS in Botswana. Multiple strict 
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interventions, aligned only with the tenets of PEPFAR, were strengthened, and new 
services were also established according to these foundations. Some of the key programs 
initiated under the partnership were: prevention of MTC (mother-to-child) transmission; 
TB/Isoniazid preventive therapy; HIV counseling and testing; orphans and vulnerable 
children; laboratory infrastructure; monitoring and evaluation; the national MASA 
antiretroviral treatment program; biomedical transmissions; drug procurement; and 
infrastructure development. (Government of Botswana 2010)  
PEPFAR’s technical assistance was fully integrated into each of the above 
programs. The process by which these programs were established, through limiting 
language and strict legal requirements, led to the development of various national 
guidelines, manuals, and systems adaptations. (Government of Botswana 2010) PEPFAR 
was also responsible for addressing human capacity needs, and supported over one 
hundred positions within various government ministries and departments. (Government 
of Botswana 2010) 
 This program, however, prevents key groups from accessing treatment and thus 
creates an additional opportunity for further victimization by major stakeholders. 
(Gillespie and Bazerman 1997:280) Due to PEPFAR’s funding of the MASA program, 
no sex worker is able to receive free ARV treatment because of the strict legal guidelines 
of PEPFAR and the subsequent mission guidelines of MASA. Here as victims, sex 
workers and MSM constitute a disproportionate amount of cases of HIV/AIDS within 
Botswana.  
 By preventing key groups from accessing this treatment, the foundation precepts 
of PEPFAR and the government’s inability to separate from those tenets represent the 
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process of purposeful marginalization. The Government of Botswana and PEPFAR are 
the negotiating parties that are selecting groups to treat based on sociopolitical views; the 
Government of Botswana is negotiating for funding and PEPFAR is negotiating for 
support of a HIV prevention and treatment scheme that it deems socially worthy given its 
belief system, while completely isolating a key group that is an integral stakeholder in 
alleviating the pandemic in the region.   
 
BOTSWANA: ISOLATING THE MARGINALIZED 	  	  
While the public health intervention in Botswana has been successful within the 
general population, the existing government policies criminalizing behavior of 
marginalized groups is working against HIV prevention and treatment strategies. As the 
initial outposts of each arm of the public-private partnerships became fully integrated 
with the government of Botswana, they focused on the long-term sustainability of the 
intervention mechanism, not achieving an improved health outcome for the community at 
large. The government has been able to tailor and target each aspect of its intervention 
strategy to certain populations within the country, while legally isolating additional 
segments that require the same treatments for the same disease. The partnerships and 
resultant interventions must follow the laws and penal codes of the country; in order for a 
person within Botswana to receive free medical and diagnostic services provided by the 
government and the integrated public private partnerships, he or she must be a citizen 
with good standing. (Phaladze & Tlou 2006)  When the laws of the land are 
superimposed on the “successful long-term sustainable” healthcare intervention, good 
citizens get access to services while others get marginalized and isolated. It is the 
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definition of “good” that truly undermines the goal of a sustainable public health 
intervention. 
 Two of the most marginalized groups within Botswana, homosexuals and sex 
workers, engage in activities that are criminalized according to the country’s penal codes 
and thus are not considered citizens in good standing. As a highly conservative country, 
many of Botswana’s laws are guided by principles found in the Bible and perpetuated by 
the Baptist community. Penal code 155 states that prostitution is a criminalized behavior, 
as is living off of wages gained by prostitution, sentencing those determined to be 
engaging in said activities up to eight years in prison. (Government of Botswana) Penal 
codes 164 and 167 criminalize all “unnatural acts” including but not limited to those that 
have carnal knowledge against the order of nature, and those that engage in acts of 
indecency with those of the same sex. (Government of Botswana) Primary offenses can 
result in up to seven years in prison; repeat offenders can earn time as determined by the 
highest court within the country. (Government of Botswana) Penal codes actively prevent 
those who participate in declared illegal activity from accessing the successful 
intervention program.  
 The criminalization of sex work and homosexual behavior impedes evidence-
based HIV responses for these groups. The constant threat of arrest and antiquated penal 
codes that identifies a sex worker through condom carrying serve as nearly 
insurmountable barriers to the availability and sustainable uptake of HIV prevention 
programs and additional services for both sex workers and homosexuals. Sex workers 
must often remain mobile in order to avoid arrest or police-led sexual assault; this hinders 
the ability of a program to adequately help prevent and treat HIV positive individuals.  
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According to a recent study that evaluated the prevalence of violence faced by sex 
workers in 28 low-income countries, there is a strong causal link between the 
criminalization of sex work and the increased risk of contracting HIV and other sexually 
transmitted infections. (Deering et al 2013)  
Men who have sex with men face significant threats, often extremely volatile and 
dangerous in nature, which are linked to their “criminalized behaviors.” MSM, in a sense, 
face compounded stigma due to additional social prejudice of “manly” behavior within 
the country. The punitive measures in Botswana hinder the ability for MSM to organize 
and design a proper implementation strategy for HIV-related services. This poses a 
significant threat to a long-term solution to HIV; a report by amfAR shows that the 
involvement of gay men in peer outreach and community-level behavioral interventions 
can reduce HIV risk by up to 25 percent. (2010) 
 Sex workers and homosexuals constitute a comparatively large portion of cases of 
HIV/AIDs within Botswana. Underreported and overly prevalent, the presence of the 
disease in these communities and social circles is almost triple that of the heterosexual, 
monogamous citizen in Botswana. (Government of Botswana) In the UNAIDs Country 
Progress Report 2013, statistics for indicators of prevalence for both sex workers and 
men who have sex with men were “unavailable due to incomplete mapping.” (UNAIDS) 
Further analysis of government-sponsored reports showed no mention of key at-risk 
groups; terminology was limited to “ARV eligible citizens.” In the GAP Report by 
UNAIDS, Botswana had the second highest prevalence rate in the world for sex workers 
at 61.9 percent, only topped by Swaziland at 63.2 percent. (UNAIDS 2014) Botswana’s 
estimated prevalence rate for MSM stood at 13.1 percent, but much of the data was 
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inconclusive due to the limited resources available. (UNAIDS 2014) Furthermore, neither 
ACHAP nor the government discloses the presence of the disease within these two 
populations in yearly reports. Constituting less than 2 percent of the population, both 
groups were estimated to contribute to 8 percent and 7 percent of new HIV cases across 
the population in 2013, respectively. (Phaladze & Tlou 2006) High incidence rates for 
these populations continue to grow as access to care is denied.  
 In 2013, the National AIDS Coordinating Agency released Botswana’s country 
progress report to UNAIDS. Due to the completion of the 2012 Behavioral and 
Biological Surveillance Survey of HIV/AIDS on High-Risk Sub-Populations in 
Botswana, NACA was able to release preliminary HIV indicators on sex workers and 
MSM. It stated that only 54.4 percent of sex workers had been tested in the previous year 
for HIV, while 79.9 percent of MSM had been tested. (National AIDS Coordinating 
Agency 2014) The report concludes that due to the fact that no individual policies were 
put into place to protect and treat these key populations, interventions and policy 
adjustments are necessary for effecting change across the stigmatized groups. (National 
AIDS Coordinating Agency 2014) From 2012 to 2014, there has been no adjustment in 
legal standing from key human rights abuse concerns (2012) or the ability to access 
treatment (2014). (National AIDS Coordinating Agency 2014)  A strategic plan is “under 
development” with no discernable timeline for change within national government policy 
for access to care.  (National AIDS Coordinating Agency 2014) 
   An additional factor that effects and influences the isolation of these highly 
marginalized population is the cultural stigma associated with both living with HIV/AIDs 
and engaging in these behaviors.  In Botswana, there is a distinct cultural stigma for those 
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living with HIV, and the resulting discrimination creates conditions for spreading HIV 
among both general and marginalized populations. Fear of being identified as sero-
positive prevents individuals from learning their status, changing unsafe sexual 
behaviors, and caring for people who are positive. (Phaladze & Tlou 2006) This stigma 
and discrimination restricts access among the general population, and is compounded 
within marginalized populations due to the additional stigmas associated with said 
groups. In Botswana, it is not culturally acceptable to have same-sex sex, leading to an 
overwhelming denial of rights to this population. Similarly, sex workers engage in the 
behavior of the “bad woman,” and are often blamed for HIV/AIDs spread across the 
country through their promiscuity and “tainting of the good population.” (Phaladze & 
Tlou 2006) These citizens are often prevented from seeking out care due to the stigma 
associated with their behaviors; they consistently face isolation and social shunning if 
local populations discover the root of their sexual behaviors.   
 According to The Gap Report by UNAIDS, the effectiveness of mainstream HIV 
intervention programs has been called into question due to stagnant levels of access to 
condoms, lubricants, testing, and treatment for both sex workers and men who have sex 
with men in highly stigmatized, criminalized, and lower-income countries. (2014) These 
groups often have no other option for services in these countries, and are limited to 
seeking out potentially life-threatening situations in order to gain access to treatment or 
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THE ISOLATED: WORDS FROM THE SUFFERERS 	  	  
Working on the ground in Botswana provided me with a unique perspective and 
vantage point into their public healthcare intervention. I was able to see the viability of 
many aspects of the public-private partnerships that contributed to the significant drop in 
prevalence rates of HIV within the country. Whilst new annual HIV infections have 
declined by 71% between 2001 and 2011, key structural issues are undermining present 
HIV prevention efforts; as a result, the number of new HIV infections reported per year 
has barely declined in recent years. (Cohen 2008)  
While in country, I was placed with human rights organization BONELA  
(Botswana Network on HIV, Ethics, and Law). A fairly influential group in the country, 
BONELA consistently fights for the marginalized and underrepresented, disregarding 
established cultural constructs of gender, sexuality, and HIV status. Policy and social 
norms regularly prevent this organization, and the groups it strives to help fight the 
epidemic in Botswana, from achieving results from prevention and treatment strategies 
touted by the government as essential for success.  
During my time at BONELA, I worked with SISONKE, an organization that 
advocates for the rights of sex workers. Created for sex workers by sex workers, 
SISONKE endeavors to increase access to free ARV treatment provided by ACHAP and 
preventative care (condoms) by the government.  The organization is not designed to 
persuade women out of their chosen profession, but support their choices and ensure 
equal access to care regardless of their criminalized status.  Working for this organization 
also constitutes a criminalized activity; it is unable to operate independently of BONELA 
without constant fear of punitive charges. The legal implications of working with, and 
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for, sex workers create a significant hurdle in providing the care to this victimized group.   
On my first day at Sisonke, my supervisor and former sex worker Tosh took me to 
visit three urban slums known for active sex-work communities: Tlokweng, Old Naledi, 
and Phase One. We went to discuss feasible goals and deliverables that the women 
wished to see from me during my internship; it also served as a venture into a cultural 
landscape completely unfamiliar to me. The slums encompassed five to seven square 
miles each, with the general dwelling occupying less than a 20 m2 space. Building 
materials were mostly corrugated metal pieces, timbers, and tarps. There is no electricity 
or running water in Tlokweng and Old Naledi; infrastructure for proper sanitation is 
minimal at best. Phase One was comprised of cinderblock houses, some of which had 
electricity for minimal lights and televisions.    
The driveway Tosh and I pulled into in Phase One was made of uneven dirt, a 
reddish brown substance that colored everything that touched it. Litter covered the 
ground as Tosh and I walked back to greet our focus group. Next to the doorway of a 
wall comprised of crumbling cinderblock was a small washbasin with murky brown 
water, a laundry board, and a small pile of clothes. I asked Tosh if this is how everything 
is washed here, and she explained to me that due to little running water in Phase One, 
most clothes were just scrubbed in the bucket and left to dry exposed to the dust-filled 
air. When I posed the question of creating a Malarial breeding ground, Tosh replied that 
it was only a concern during the worst months of summer, in which most water would be 
changed everyday. In the dead of winter, however, it was of minimal importance to 
change the clean water for clothes and linen washing. Many women used the same 
buckets for bathing first, partially soapy water and body oils tainting the water for 
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washing. Tosh emphasized that cups and glasses may even be washed in this water, 
potentially bringing three sources of cross contamination into the mix. The situational 
circumstance surrounding the most mundane aspects of living, or here, learning to live 
with the least, helps provide a greater understanding of the inherent limitations that many 
people face living in the slum districts.     
Entering into a small one-room house in Phase One, we began a shuffle of proper 
seating arrangements acceptable for the twelve active sex workers attending our focus 
group. I was immediately instructed to take the largest, most comfortable looking seat as 
others sat on the floor. Invoking protest, I offered to give my chair to Tosh. She replied 
that I was an outsider, in every sense. White, university educated, and American, I was 
idealized by these women. Three would not make direct eye contact and many did not 
want to directly address me in the greetings. After going through this slightly 
uncomfortable cultural dance, Tosh began addressing the women in Setswana before 
switching over to English. I asked a group of 12 active sex workers what they needed 
from my organization. The responses, ranging from the extraordinary (a cure for HIV) to 
the simplistic (clean water), reflected the complex challenges prohibiting these women 
from realizing a successful lifestyle. Seemingly intangible for a minor NGO, I rephrased 
my question to what I could do to improve their standards of living on a more immediate 
timeline. Ndadi, Momi, and Moshane, sex workers for eight, six, and two years 
respectively, began a dialogue that was representative of the true problems afflicting the 
entire population of sex workers within country: 
Ndadi: Can you change the laws? That is what we need most.  
Me: No, I don’t think I can, [pause] but I know others are trying to do this for 
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you.  
Ndadi: We need the laws changed so I can get my medicines here.  I am sick of 
going to South Africa [where the clinics give them] to get treatment.  
Momi: I also do not want to get threatened with arrest every time I go to get 
condoms!  
Me: They arrest you when you go to get condoms? Every time?  
Momi: It depends on where you go.  Most of the time, they do not even have 
condoms! Then we do not use condoms.   
Ndadi: Men will pay [more] for that anyway.   
Moshane: Why should we use condoms? It doesn’t do anything anyway. 
Me: Because it protects you from certain diseases.  
Moshane: We already have the diseases. We cannot get condoms, we cannot get 
ARVs without papers, we can’t get… we cannot go to the clinic without fear of 
getting arrested!  Why should I protect others if I can’t be helped? (personal 
interview, May 30, 2013) 
The exchange between these women revealed a sense of isolation felt by those ostracized 
by policies preventing them from accessing care. This discussion also reveals two major 
public health effects afflicting those prevented from accessing the benefits of the public-
private partnerships in Botswana; not only are these women prevented from saving their 
own lives through the idiosyncratic policies governing ARV and preventative care access, 
but they also perpetuate the spread of multiple diseases because they cannot access these 
care models. Additionally, as ACHAP begins its withdrawal and transitions the entirety 
of the program to the government of Botswana, there is a risk that sex workers and MSM 
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will lose any access to care they previously had. A third party no longer stands in the way 
of reporting cases of this criminalized behavior, further reducing incentives for either 
group to seek out care due to fear of retribution.   
 Approximately one month after the previous exchange, I was preparing to return 
to Phase One to meet with the women engaged with Sisonke to discuss some of my 
progress and deliver boxes of condoms. Acquiring the condoms was in of itself an 
arduous process; it took three separate visits to the Ministry of Health with two separate 
sponsors to acquire only five hundred condoms. Consistently given the run-around by the 
officials in the department, BONELA sent a representative with Tosh and I to put a little 
more muster in our requests. After filling out extensive paperwork to acquire the free 
boxes provided by ACHAP, Tosh explained that through these various stop-gates and 
red-tape maneuvers, the government was able to strictly control who could access to free 
condoms. By controlling the availability through required literacy and familiarity, the 
most at-risk groups continue to be victimized through the structural violence in play.   
 Arriving in the driveway of Moshane’s home, she and four other sex workers 
from our previous session came to the car. Barely leaving the vehicle, one reminded me 
to take my bag from the backseat even if we were not going to enter the home. Tosh 
chided me for being too trusting, and too American. In an area ripe with petty theft, 
anything valuable “in a land of nothing” is quickly snatched, not out of thrill but out of 
necessity. I quickly understood that the value of my laptop far exceeded the value of the 
home into which I entered, and it allowed me to wonder if there was a financial 
correlation for these women and their chosen profession.  
 Tosh handed out condoms to the women in the room, quickly emptying the box 
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we spent weeks acquiring, and I struck up a conversation with Moshane. After explaining 
what I had been working on for the past month (grant writing for the organization to 
jumpstart additional programming across the country), I asked her what had happened in 
the previous month:  
 Moshane: Many of my friends this month were arrested  
 Me:  For sex work?  
 Moshane: Yes, for sex work.  And one for refusing sex work with a police officer. 
 Me: How common is that?  
 Tosh: Very common [in Setswana to Moshane]. Why did they take her?  
Moshane: He [the officer] would not pay. She refused to go with him so he took 
her to jail.  She was there for three days.    
Me: Moshane, you do not have to answer me, but why do you do this when you 
know the risks?  
Moshane: My mother was a sex worker, and now so am I. But I do not want to 
leave it.  
Me: Why?  
Moshane: I make good money. It is easy… men are easy to please with your 
body.  
Two other women joined us at this point, Cynthia (she chose her name) and Dumana.   
 Cynthia: You can do it like this [imitates her favorite sex position]  
Dumana: No, that is no good, you move like this [shows a different speed to the 
previous position]  
Laugher echoes for a few minutes from all parties, and Moshane pokes my blushing 
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cheeks 
Moshane: Liz, would you do our work? We can show you the best ways. Plus, 
men would like you here. 
Tosh: No, of course not! She is white!  
Me: I don't think I could do it… but it seems as if you like it.  
Dumana: It is much better now [than before] because Tosh does not wish to 
change us.  
Cynthia: I could never have another job. This makes me money quickly. Where 
else can you make money so quickly? It is what I do.  
Moshane: It is what we do. (personal interview, June 29, 2013) 
This conversation revealed that many of these women do not wish to leave their 
profession, as it is often inferred by outside organizing agencies. They exercise their own 
freedoms within their bodies, facing significant health and safety risks. By engaging with 
an organization that supports them in these decisions, rather than manipulates them, there 
exists a level of trust and camaraderie that isn’t seen through regulatory programs. In a 
report by the Lancet, further evaluation of sex work programs shows that when sex 
workers are involved in the management of a safer sex or advocacy program, sero-
prevalence is more likely to stay the same or decrease within the engaged population. 
(Loff et al 2003: 1983) Loff discusses how it is important to increase social capital 
among sex workers, “allowing them to organise and lobby for better working conditions, 
would seem to be a more effective approach than creating new means of abuse, especially 
in environments prone to corruption.” (2003: 1983) Sisonke is striving to engage with the 
community in this manner on the ground, but cannot effectively do so with the continued 
	   47	  
stop-gates in place that would allow for an open, constructive dialogue with all parties 
involved. With minimal emphasis on promoting these programs, the government and the 
various PPPs are inhibiting the ability for marginalized groups to level the playing field 
of access to care and ostensibly, the ability to truly stem the sero-prevalence rates within 
these key groups.  
THE ECONOMICS OF HIV IN BOTSWANA 	  	  
While it is difficult to directly correlate the effects of HIV/AIDS on country-wide 
economics, key indicators of economic performance can be evaluated in comparison with 
affected sectors and subsequent markers. HIV has significant implications both macro- 
economically and micro-economically and in a country as hard-hit as Botswana, these 
compounded effects are clearly linked. Due to the extremely high levels of HIV in 
Botswana, in 2006 the government commissioned a study on the economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS in the country. While the data is limited in that it conforms to the regular 
reporting mechanisms of the country and does not segment for marginalized populations, 
it paints a descriptive picture of the economic outlook of Botswana with a very 
aggressive HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is important to note that the economic projections 
performed by the independent contractor draws upon data unavailable to the public as the 
government provided the data, with individualized research performed by the contractor.  
While it is important to acknowledge the limitations of a single set of data, Botswana is 
one of two countries with a detailed economic projection of the costs of HIV on country 
GDP for a long-term future of the epidemic. Comparisons of the government sponsored 
data available in the report and HIV statistics given by UNAIDS, demonstrate some 
similarities and allow for several conclusions to be drawn.   
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From a macroeconomic standpoint, HIV/AIDS considerably affects the size of the 
labor force, the availability of skills, and productivity (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006). As 
healthcare and health systems expand to combat and treat HIV, the diversion of resources 
to the healthcare sector has the ability to impact spending in other sectors that may be 
used to finance investments (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006). The report identifies two 
channels through which macroeconomic impact can be measured; rising morbidity and 
rising mortality. The conclusions are detailed below: 
• Rising Morbidity Impacts: 
o Reduced productivity due to: worker’s time off or sick leave, lower 
productivity at work due to illness; 
o Increased expenditures on: healthcare (all levels), training (to replace sick 
workers), sick pay (by firms and governments); 
o Reduced investment (public and private) due to: lower expected profits, 
increased economic uncertainty, diminished ability to finance investment due 
to lower savings; 
• Rising Mortality Impacts: 
o Smaller population and labor force; 
o Changed age structure of the labor force, affecting skill, experience, and 
productivity; 
o Availability of skilled workers and labor force participation rates. (Ecoconsult 
Botswana 2006) 
As this information indicates, rising morbidity and mortality has the ability to 
significantly impact factors that contribute to output GDP. By negatively affecting size, 
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skill structure, and productivity of the labor force, in conjunction with reducing the rate 
of investment and available capital, the report states that as long as AIDS is a serious 
health concern to the population it has the ability to negatively affect GDP growth. 
(Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
 In order to accurately capture the macroeconomic impact of AIDS in Botswana, 
the report focused on long-term GDP growth and per capital real incomes. It simulated 
the economy through a 20-year period (2001-2021) with three scenarios that draw on the 
above-described impacts. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Using three key scenarios of “no-
AIDS” (AIDS is not present in the population), “AIDS with ART” (full ARV coverage in 
the population), and “AIDS without ART” (AIDS present in the population with no 
provided ARVs), the report was able to make projections on vital economic variables and 
GDP. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
 In looking at the size of the labor force, the model reveals that there is a large 
impact by HIV/AIDS. Assuming a consistent labor force participation rate, in 2021 the 
labor force would increase by 89 percent in the no-AIDS scenario, 61 percent in the 
AIDS-with-ART scenario, and 48 percent in the AIDS-without-ART scenario. 
(Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)  Additionally, there is a slight change in the age structure of 
the labor force for each scenario. In 2021, projections estimate that the average age would 
increase from 33 to 35 for no-AIDS and remain at 33 with AIDS in the population, 
shifting the labor force to a younger age structure. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
 In calculating the real-GDP shifts, between 2001 and 2021, the model predicts an 
average annual rate of 4.5 percent with no AIDS present in the population and 3.7 percent 
for AIDS-without-ART. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) GDP growth increases to 3.9 
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percent per annum when consistent ART coverage is introduced, and is reflective of a 
positive impact from increased participation by the labor force. (Ecoconsult Botswana 
2006) Given these growth rates, in 2021, Botswana’s GDP is 17.7 percent smaller with 
AIDS present and only 13.2 percent smaller with consistent ART coverage (Figure 3).    
This model does not take into consideration labor force participation rates, 
variation in HIV/AIDS prevalence across skill categories, investment rate, productivity, 
and skilled labor force growth. In a supplementary analysis by Arndt & Lewis, each of 
the previously mentioned factors is incorporated into the real-GDP analysis. The changes 
to the parameters for input values are summarized in Table 1. (Ecoconsult Botswana 
2006)  
The alternative case, with affected parameters, reveals no change in the no-AIDS 
scenario as expected. The output for AIDS-without-ART shows an extremely low GDP 
growth rate of 2.5 percent per annum, while AIDS-with-ART shows a growth rate of 3.3 
percent Adjusted for 2021, the alternative case shows a GDP that is 34 percent smaller 
for AIDS-without-ART and only 23 percent smaller for AIDS-with-ART (Figure 4). 
(Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
Through the analysis of the alternative case, it shows that HIV/AIDS has the 
ability to significantly reduce economic growth through its impact on investment, 
productivity, population, and the labor force. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) While 
consistent ART introduction raises the economic growth rate, the subsequent cost of 
ARV treatment for the entire population poses a substantial risk to growth. (Ecoconsult 
Botswana 2006)  The largest factor in the reduction in growth as a result of HIV/AIDS is 
reduced capital stock, which contributes 48 percent to the fall in growth. (Ecoconsult 
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Botswana 2006)   
 A second economic category to observe in Botswana is the effect of HIV/AIDS 
on individual households. Affected households face increased expenditures and reduced 
income due to mortality and morbidity. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) HIV proportionately 
affects income level of a household with the introduction of the disease to that household; 
wealthier households may opt for private or insurance covered treatment, with additional 
out-of-pocket costs, while the poorest households must utilize state-provided care, with 
transportation and adjusted dietary costs. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Additionally, HIV 
can affect overall income per household or income per household member. If an income-
producing household member dies, overall income is reduced; if a non-income producing 
household member dies, per capita income increases for family members. (Ecoconsult 
Botswana 2006) In Botswana, funeral costs significantly add to the increased 
expenditures due to AIDS, and can further contribute to increased poverty in individual 
households. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
 Through the analysis of the above scenarios, a few key findings were revealed. If 
there was no worker replacement for a household with an AIDS death, household income 
falls by 45 percent, which raises the national poverty rate from the baseline at 33 percent 
to 36 percent. However, household income only falls by 15 percent and the national 
poverty rate only rises to 34 percent when ART treatment is introduced to these 
households. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Thus the introduction of ART treatment into 
these households only mitigates the impact of HIV/AIDS by 1 percent overall. 
(Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Households in the lowest quintile would experience a 36 
percent decline in per capita income over a ten-year period due to HIV/AIDS, further 
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cementing their place in poverty. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006)   
 A final, more impactful analysis surrounds the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
government spending and fiscal effects over the projected twenty-year analysis. 
(Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) The largest expenditures of the government of Botswana to 
combat HIV are ART, Orphan Care, and Home Based Support. It is important to note that 
the government currently receives significant donor-based contributions to support its 
ARV provision program, with intensive structural support from the previously discussed 
public-private partnerships. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) These relationships make the 
programs fiscally achievable, and the report attempts to remove the residual effects of 
such contributions.  
 The report projected the impact the expenditures of HIV-related programs on 
overall GDP and government spending. The highest spending time period was projected 
to be from 2010 to 2012, in which costs will reach 8.8 percent of government spending 
and 3.5 percent of the GDP if ART is provided. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Similarly, if 
ART is not provided, expenditures will be 7.8 percent overall government healthcare 
spending and 3.1 percent of the GDP. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) Therefore, even 
though the total cost of providing ART is considerable, the additional cost is offset by the 
potential incremental costs of not providing the treatment through additional healthcare 
spending and orphan care when these services are not provided. (Ecoconsult Botswana 
2006)   
 The model does not take into account the fiscal support from donors, which 
amounted to US$96 million for the duration of the estimates until 2021. (Ecoconsult 
Botswana 2006) Through the mandates of the donations, an overwhelming majority of 
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the funding will go towards ART provisions and prevention programming.   
 The incremental increase of government spending on ART will help unlock 
additional GDP throughout the life of the program and the fight against HIV/AIDS. As 
previously discussed, the additional GDP growth will result from a larger population and 
labor force that is more productive and healthier than estimated without ART provided by 
the government. (Ecoconsult Botswana 2006) This higher GDP with ART scenario 
generates additional revenues due to the more active, working population. (Ecoconsult 
Botswana 2006) The report estimates that the incremental revenues on the additional 
GDP, when net of other costs, will help cover the cost of the ART program (Figure 5).  
 Overall, the fiscal costs of HIV/AIDS are very high for Botswana, which has seen 
slowed government revenue growth due to a decrease in diamond production. In order for 
Botswana to successfully achieve their projected growth and surpass the epidemic in 
country, spending needs to be reallocated appropriately and strictly controlled. 
(Ecoconsult Botswana) The report emphasizes that the long-term sustainability of the 
program hangs on proper financing of the programs, with a watchful eye to prevent 
deficit financing. (Ecoconsult Botswana)   
 This analysis paints an undeniable picture of posterity if the Government of 
Botswana continues to provide ARV treatment to its citizens within current parameters.  
The report, however, does not address the need or overall effects of providing for all 
classes of citizens within Botswana. While difficult to project, the economic effect of 
providing treatment to MSM and sex workers, along with other marginalized groups that 
currently fall outside of the treatment spectrum, would most likely lead to a more 
healthful population and increase economic activity overall. It is likely that inpatient care 
	   54	  
and associated expenditures would decrease, and the healthful labor population would 
continue to grow as the epidemic has an additional stop-gate to its spread. The 
importance of treating the entire population, including those previously left behind, can 
be inferred from interpreting the data at the no-ARV and ARV scenarios; a bleak outlook 
for one population (no-ARV) significantly effects the entire population, even when the 
outlook for most seems promising.   
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF RECASTING SUSTAINABILITY IN BOTSWANA 
AND WORLDWIDE 	  	  
 The public-private partnerships in Botswana are considered models of excellence 
within the global health community in the fight against HIV/ AIDS.  Botswana’s 
characteristics appealed to international partnerships as a means to attain a potential 
foothold in the international public health world, identifying characteristics and 
implementing models regarded by the international community as essential for success.  
Through public-private partnerships, community organizations, and government 
involvement, Botswana has been able to create a significant reduction in reported HIV 
prevalence rates amongst the good citizens. Unique characteristics allowed Botswana to 
achieve its success. Independently, each arm of partnership would have achieved a 
fractional component of success in comparison to the total outcomes currently observed 
in the country. The situational factors, in combination with cooperation between various 
public and private entities, have fostered the development of a false sense of reality with 
respect to the potential for success of similar interventions.  
When looking at Botswana as a case study for success of a lauded international 
program, the immediate reporting mechanisms that validate the actions of the government 
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and partners identify areas of improvement that each group has been able to overcome in 
comparison with other equally effected countries. Minimal reporting and undefined 
demographic specific plans for addressing the most at risk groups paints an incomplete 
picture of the epidemic within Botswana. Thirty years after the first reported case, 
Botswana has yet to create a holistic plan to address the most at risk groups for 
contracting HIV/AIDS. Given the cultural context of the country, with extreme stigma, 
discrimination, and antiquated legal precedents against these groups, the epidemic 
continues to disproportionately affect those that fall into these categories. The country is 
able to manipulate statistics, selectively report, and take advantage of programs that wish 
to show advanced outcomes given a “mostly developed” country in the HIV-ravaged 
Africa. The MASA program drew in donors and continued support by various developed 
countries and international donation programs by creating the idea of equal opportunity 
for complete treatment and ARV provisions. While admirable in theory, it is clear that the 
epidemic continues to ravage the untreated populations and cause a subsequent spread of 
HIV among the general population.   
Botswana represents the “best of the worst”: it uses professed sustainable 
frameworks to proclaim success for most, while ignoring the lives of those who do not 
fulfill appropriate social constructs. From an international prevention mechanism 
viewpoint, the positive outcomes implore others to consider this same mechanism, 
without revealing the true presence and prevalence of disease within the country. The 
social constructs within Botswana prohibit these groups from accessing care that is seen 
as the right of the citizen, essentially categorizing said groups into non-citizen, unworthy 
categories. By both legally and socially preventing high-risk groups from accessing 
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treatment (ARVs) and prevention, the government is inhibiting itself from achieving its 
goals of prevalence reduction.  Each group lacks the infrastructure and incentives to 
protect itself from spreading the disease; without access to care or a way to prevent 
spread, there remains no pathway for these groups to achieve these goals, rendering 
future efforts as futile. By criminalizing the activities of the two groups with the highest 
sero-prevalence rates, the government of Botswana is promoting the spread of the disease 
it strives to eradicate.  
Economically, and socially, Botswana cannot continue to ignore the needs of 
these key groups. As previously discussed, the economic effect of HIV on the population, 
given the prevalence rate and overall effect on GDP, the labor force, and production of 
goods and services, the country is at risk of significantly effecting its overall position as 
one of the more developed countries in Africa. Diamond production is beginning to slow 
and the economy is at risk of stagnating and decreasing overall. The trickle down effect 
of leaving largely prevalent groups of HIV-infected individuals untreated will result in 
continued spread of the disease throughout the population and impact the economy at 
large. By preventing treatment for any individual, whether a “good” citizen or one who 
engages in criminalized activity, there remains an impact of the production power of a 
country. Untreated, either of these groups drain resources and impact the workforce’s 
ability to produce through spreading the disease and increasing the need for more 
treatment, utilizing secondary healthcare services, decreasing the size of the labor force, 
and reducing spending and increasing debt due to treatment and funeral costs. The 
selective withholding of life sustaining treatment to any segment of the population will 
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continue to have far reaching effects across the country, especially one with a relatively 
small population and limited sectors for economic growth.   
 Through the critical evaluation of Botswana’s national ARV program and 
partnerships with ACHAP, PEPFAR, and universities, it can be seen that factors deemed 
necessary to create a sustainable program are not only harming certain segments of the 
population, but are also harming the country at large. The current polices around HIV 
treatment will never enable full eradication of the disease and thus subjects the country to 
an endless need for local and international resources. While this same form of negligence 
and ignorance may not be repeated in every long-term sustainable healthcare intervention 
mechanism, it identifies key concerns for the global public health community. As 
providers, organizations that are creating programs designed to integrate with local 
customs and government policy must consider the overarching health goals of the 
program and whether such goals are achievable given a particular country’s situational 
factors. The public healthcare community would be remiss to disregard the rampant 
discrimination of high-risk individuals given the impact that has on disease eradication.    
The AIDS epidemic is ever more an aggregation of multiple local epidemics. In 
order to successfully combat the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on ravaged regions, 
healthcare interventions must bring services out of centralized health centers and to the 
populations who need it most. (Ecoconsult 2006) Increasing access of medication and 
services to combat stigma and discrimination is essential to fully combatting the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic for key populations. Placing an emphasis on appropriate 
technologies and social change programs that are relevant on a country-by-country basis 
would vastly increase the effectiveness of the money utilized to bring these programs to 
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those who need them, while potentially increasing adherence and decreasing overall 
costs. Within the current context of Botswana, however, the various plans of action do 
not include any of these provisions. Sustainability and integration is key for long-term 
success, but only when it addresses these factors. When sustainability and integration are 
negatively affecting the ability to combat localized epidemics, there is no potential end to 
the epidemic at large.   
To be effective, HIV programs and services must be grounded in ubiquitous 
concepts of dignity and social justice. (WHO 2011) Prevention and treatment programs 
must be “implemented as part of an effective public health approach, even in countries 
where the marginalized are participating in illegal activities.” (WHO 2011) 
Simultaneously, work must be guided towards decriminalization. International donor 
programs must be separated from such limiting factors that prevent treatment of such 
groups. The negative effects of Botswana’s programs have been brought to light, and 
evidently explored. It is necessary to move toward equality and past the attractive draw of 
potentially reducing overall prevalence while fully ignoring those who need services the 
most. With such a morbid and highly infectious disease such as HIV, it is essential to 
move towards a more effective use of HIV funding and treatment programs. Sustainable 
programs may need to operate in difficult territory, clashing with the political norms that 
regulate countries and cultural beliefs. Respect for the bare life of a person and the 
possibility of eradicating the most deadly epidemic the world has ever seen, supersedes 
the need to completely adapt to preexisting geopolitical norms. Such programs do not 
need to be defined as “western” or developed, for they can take any form. It is imperative 
that, in order to eradicate HIV, those that reside on the margins are able to access care 
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and prevent the spread of the disease even further. These changes will be expensive, and 
long-drawn, but have the ability to truly eradicate HIV in countries with true epidemics 
and devastating effects.   
Long-term sustainable public healthcare models that are to reduce overall 
prevalence rates must incorporate policies that allow equal access to care; this may or 
may not be feasible in countries with national policy that prevent such action. If long-
term success can only truly be reached through integration and control of intervention 
mechanisms that promote isolation and therefore cause harm, overall outcomes and 
perhaps the current concept of sustainability are not the indicators of success necessary 
for global public health of today. Perhaps sustainability needs to be recast such that the 
focus of global health interventions reflect the challenges of achieving health outcomes in 
a community rather than the programmatic building blocks that support the strategy. 
Perhaps public and private partnerships as well as national governments need to focus on 
health as the goal regardless of the challenge such an approach may represent to social 
norms. Perhaps only then do we achieve sustainable cures for the world’s most 
devastating diseases.	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